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In the early 1940s, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union allied against the Axis Powers in hopes of first guaranteeing their own survival, then liberating Eurasia. In the case of the former two versus the USSR their ideology was tremendously different, but an alliance was the only way any of them could hope to survive. Consequently, and alliance—not of friendship, but of protection—was solidified between the three.
Why is it important to say this? Because it justifies both FDR and Truman’s decision not to share nuclear secrets with the Soviet Union. They were our ally, yes, but not our friend. Many are mistaken in this thought: they feel the term “ally” is synonymous with the word “friend.” This is not always the case. As they say “Politics makes for strange bedfellows.”
The U.S. and Great Britain wanted to keep nuclear secrets all to themselves. Why? It makes sense that, having spent billions to discover and create the most devastating weapon in humankind, they would want to protect it. What would happen if an enemy—or would-be enemy—got their hands on an atomic weapon? It could mean the end of Western civilization. Consequently, the U.S. and Britain formed a small group of nations, now having seven (probably at least two additional undeclared) members. We call it the “nuclear club” and it consists, of course, of the U.S., Britain, France, USSR, China, India, and Pakistan (almost certainly Israel too and quite possibly Japan).
If the U.S. could keep the Communists from getting their hands on such a weapon, there would be no worries about future wars. After all, if MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) is a sufficient deterrent to nuclear warfare, how much more so would be “we-assure-your-destruction-but-not-ours?” No one, including the USSR (who, it seems, were destined to become our future enemies) would dare attack us and therefore guarantee our own destruction.
Unfortunately, there is a geo-political factor known as the “balance of power.” It basically states that no one nation can have the power to wipe out (or greatly destabilize) another lest the powerful nation become desirous of conquering the smaller (which leads to the build up of hostile systems of alliance and almost certain war). The U.S. had greatly tipped the balance of power when we deployed nuclear arms and the USSR feared that we might possibly seek to destroy them as a way of pre-empting a more serious war later. In the sense that we tipped the balance of power, we did the wrong thing. However, it is unreasonable to think that we’d hand over national security information simply in order to hope for good relations and so as not to tip the balance of power. No, giving away our nuclear secrets would have been a measure of “good faith” and may have sweetened the relationship between the U.S. and the USSR, but there is no way that this, nor anything else, could have prevented hostility from existing between a country which believes in freedom and liberty and one that kills millions of its own citizens (as in Lenin and Stalin’s purges).
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